Pecuniary and Non-Pecuniary Motivations for Tax Compliance: Evidence from Pakistan

Joel Slemrod, Obeid Ur Rehman, Mazhar Waseem and Mazhar Waseem
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Mazhar Waseem

No 7731, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We examine two Pakistani programs to explore the role of deterrence as well as social and psychological factors in the tax compliance behavior of agents. In the first of these programs, the government began revealing income tax paid by every taxpayer in the country. The second program publicly recognizes and rewards the top 100 tax paying corporations, partnerships, self-employed individuals, and wage-earners. We find that both public disclosure and social recognition of top taxpayers caused a substantial increase in tax payments. We explore the drivers of this behavior, including the shift of social norms toward compliance.

Keywords: tax evasion; income tax; social norms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H24 H25 H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-iue and nep-pbe
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Working Paper: Pecuniary and Non-Pecuniary Motivations for Tax Compliance: Evidence from Pakistan (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7731

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