Israel, the Palestinian Factions, and the Cycle of Violence
David Jaeger and
M. Daniele Paserman
No 23, Working Papers from Department of Economics, College of William and Mary
Abstract:
In this study we extend our previous work to examine the dynamic relationship between violence committed by Palestinian factions and that committed by Israel during the Second Intifada. We find a statistically significant relationship between Israeli fatalities claimed by groups associated with the ruling political party, Fatah, and subsequent Palestinian fatalities. We do not find a similar relationship for Israeli fatalities claimed by Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and other Palestinian factions. We conjecture that these differences are due to the different positions of the factions vis-ˆ-vis bargaining over a two-state solution to the conflict as well as the organizational structures of the factions.
Keywords: Intifada; terrorism; conflict resolution; bargaining; violence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C32 D71 D74 H56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14 pages
Date: 2005-12-31
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cwa
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)
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http://economics.wm.edu/wp/cwm_wp23.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: Israel, the Palestinian Factions, and the Cycle of Violence (2006)
Working Paper: Israel, the Palestinian Factions and the Cycle of Violence (2006)
Working Paper: Israel, the Palestinian Factions, and the Cycle of Violence (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cwm:wpaper:23
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