The Limits of Traditional Bargaining under Deep Integration: TTIP Stumbling over Technical Barriers to Trade

Benjamin Bürbaumer

Journal of Common Market Studies, 2021, vol. 59, issue 5, 1069-1085

Abstract: Removing so‐called technical barriers to trade is a critical aspect of contemporary deep integration trade agreements. Yet, these barriers – standards, regulations, conformity assessment procedures – form a set of institutional complementarities, named technical infrastructure, which performs a central role for the functioning of integrated markets. Drawing on evidence from the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) the paper illustrates that this contradiction reduced the negotiators' bargaining leeway. Changing a technical infrastructure comes at the risk of undermining its effectiveness. Therefore, each party could only offer an unacceptable compromise: Transforming the other's technical infrastructure towards one's own technical infrastructure.

Date: 2021
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