U.S. Free Trade Agreements and Enforcement of Labor Law in Latin America

Sabina Dewan and Lucas Ronconi

Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, 2018, vol. 57, issue 1, 35-56

Abstract: The paper provides difference†in†differences estimates suggesting that Latin American countries that signed a free trade agreement with the United States experienced an increase in the number of labor inspectors and inspections. We also find large heterogeneity across signers and no evidence that the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) had a positive impact on Mexico. We conclude by suggesting that the stringency of content of the accord and the resources devoted by the U.S. government to increase enforcement make a difference.

Date: 2018
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https://doi.org/10.1111/irel.12199

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Working Paper: U.S. Free Trade Agreements and Enforcement of Labor Law in Latin America (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:indres:v:57:y:2018:i:1:p:35-56

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