Bad bank resolutions and bank lending

Michael Brei, Leonardo Gambacorta, Marcella Lucchetta and Bruno Maria Parigi

No 837, BIS Working Papers from Bank for International Settlements

Abstract: The paper investigates whether impaired asset segregation tools, otherwise known as bad banks, and recapitalisation lead to a recovery in the originating banks' lending and a reduction in non-performing loans (NPLs). Results are based on a novel data set covering 135 banks from 15 European banking systems over the period 2000-16. The main finding is that bad bank segregations are effective in cleaning up balance sheets and promoting bank lending only if they combine recapitalisation with asset segregation. Used in isolation, neither tool will suffice to spur lending and reduce future NPLs. Exploiting the heterogeneity in asset segregation events, we find that asset segregation is more effective when: (i) asset purchases are funded privately; (ii) smaller shares of the originating bank's assets are segregated; and (iii) asset segregation occurs in countries with more efficient legal systems. Our results continue to hold when we address the potential endogeneity problem associated with the creation of a bad bank.

Keywords: bad banks; resolutions; lending; non-performing loans; rescue packages; recapitalisations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E44 G01 G21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41pages
Date: 2020-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-cba, nep-eec and nep-mac
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.bis.org/publ/work837.pdf Full PDF document (application/pdf)
https://www.bis.org/publ/work837.htm (text/html)

Related works:
Working Paper: Bad bank resolutions and bank lending (2020)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bis:biswps:837

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in BIS Working Papers from Bank for International Settlements Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Martin Fessler ().