Stable coalition structures in simple games with veto control

Baris Çiftçi and Dinko Dimitrov
Additional contact information
Baris Çiftçi: Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

No 384, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers from Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

Abstract: In this paper we study hedonic coalition formation games in which players' preferences over coalitions are induced by a semi-value of a monotonic simple game with veto control. We consider partitions of the player set in which the winning coalition contains the union of all minimal winning coalitions, and show that each of these partitions belongs to the strict core of the hedonic game. Exactly such coalition structures constitute the strict core when the simple game is symmetric. Provided that the veto player set is not a winning coalition in a symmetric simple game, then the partition containing the grand coalition is the unique strictly core stable coalition structure.

Keywords: Strict core; Semi-value; Shapley value; Banzhaf value; Simple game; Hedonic game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-08-12
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/download/2315533/2319810 First Version, 2006 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Stable Coalition Structures in Simple Games with Veto Control (2006)
Working Paper: Stable Coalition Structures in Simple Games with Veto Control (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bie:wpaper:384

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers from Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Bettina Weingarten ().