Structural Estimation of a Model of School Choices: the Boston Mechanism vs. Its Alternatives
Caterina Calsamiglia,
Chao Fu and
Maia Güell
No 811, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics
Abstract:
An important debate centers on what procedure should be used to allocate students across public schools. We contribute to this debate by developing and estimating a model of school choices by households under one of the most popular procedures known as the Boston mechanism (BM). We recover the joint distribution of household preferences and sophistication types using administrative data from Barcelona. Our counterfactual policy analyses show that a change from BM to the Gale-Shapley student deferred acceptance mechanism would create more losers than winners, while a change from BM to the top trading cycles mechanism has the opposite effect.
Keywords: school choice; Boston mechanism; Gale-Shapley mechanism; Top Trading Cycles mechanism; priorities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D63 I24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-edu, nep-gth and nep-ure
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (33)
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Related works:
Working Paper: Structural Estimation of a Model of School Choices: the Boston Mechanism vs. Its Alternatives (2018)
Working Paper: Structural Estimation of a Model of School Choices: the Boston Mechanism vs. Its Alternatives (2018)
Working Paper: Structural Estimation of a Model of School Choices: the Boston Mechanism vs. its Alternatives (2016)
Working Paper: Structural Estimation of a Model of School Choices: the Boston Mechanism vs. Its Alternatives (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bge:wpaper:811
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