Monotone Strategyproofness

Hanna Halaburda and Guillaume Haeringer

No 712, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: We propose a way to compare the extent of preference misrepresentation between two strategies. We define a mechanism to be monotone strategyproof when declaring a “more truthful” preference ordering in the mechanism dominates – with respect to the true preferences – declaring a less truthful preference ordering. Our main result states that a mechanism is strategyproof if, and only if, it is monotone strategyproof. This result holds for any deterministic social choice function on any domain; for probabilistic social choice functions it holds under a mild assumption on the domain.

Keywords: strategyproofness; Kemeny sets; misrepresentations; dominant strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Monotone strategyproofness (2016)
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