Efficiency vs. agency motivations for bank takeovers: some empirical evidence

Alessio De Vincenzo (), Claudio Doria () and Carmelo Salleo
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Alessio De Vincenzo: Bank of Italy
Claudio Doria: Bank of Italy

No 587, Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) from Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area

Abstract: Bank takeovers result on average in little improvements in performance. This may be due to conflicting driving forces behind them; however these have seldom been studied. We study directly the motivations for bank acquisitions by analyzing the prices paid for them, under the assumption that bankers are willing to pay for what they want. We find that there is no evidence that bankers are ready to pay for possible economies of scale and scope; on the other hand buyers expect to transfer their superior managerial skills to targets. Market power seems to hold little value while entry (or diversification) commands a premium. Agency issues at the buyer are also an important motivation for takeovers: other things being equal acquirers with more free capital are willing to pay more.

Keywords: banking; M&As; pricing; corporate governance; market power (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G34 L21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-com, nep-fin, nep-fmk and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bdi:wptemi:td_587_06

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