A note on contests with a constrained choice set of effort

Doron Klunover and John Morgan

Abstract: We consider a symmetric two-player contest, in which the choice set of effort is constrained. We apply a fundamental property of the payoff function to show that, under standard assumptions, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. It is shown that all equilibria are near the unconstrained equilibrium. Perhaps surprisingly, this is not the case when players have different prize evaluations.

Date: 2018-09, Revised 2020-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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