Optimal access regulation with downstream competition

Tina Kao, Flavio Menezes and John Quiggin

No 151201, Risk and Sustainable Management Group Working Papers from University of Queensland, School of Economics

Abstract: We analyse access price setting to a bottleneck facility where the fa- cility owner also competes in the deregulated downstream market. We consider a continuum of market structures from Cournot to Bertrand. These market structures are fully characterised by a single parame- ter representing the intensity of competition. We first show how the efficient component pricing rule (ECPR) should be modified as the downstream competitive intensity changes. We then analyse the opti- mal access price where a total-surplus-maximizing regulator trades off production efficiency and pro-competitive effects.

Keywords: Industrial; Organization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22
Date: 2012-03-29
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Related works:
Journal Article: Optimal access regulation with downstream competition (2014)
Working Paper: Optimal Access Regulation with Downstream Competition (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:uqsers:151201

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.151201

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