The Economics of Credence Goods: An Experiment on the Role of Liability, Verifiability, Reputation, and Competition

Uwe Dulleck, Rudolf Kerschbamer and Matthias Sutter

American Economic Review, 2011, vol. 101, issue 2, 526-55

Abstract: Credence goods markets are characterized by asymmetric information between sellers and consumers that may give rise to inefficiencies, such as under- and overtreatment or market breakdown. We study in a large experiment with 936 participants the determinants for efficiency in credence goods markets. While theory predicts that liability or verifiability yield efficiency, we find that liability has a crucial, but verifiability at best a minor, effect. Allowing sellers to build up reputation has little influence, as predicted. Seller competition drives down prices and yields maximal trade, but does not lead to higher efficiency as long as liability is violated. (JEL D12, D82)

Date: 2011
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