Why the Weak Win: The Strategic Role of Investment in Lobbying

Richard Damania
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Richard Damania: School of Economics, University of Adelaide

No 1998-09, School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers from University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy

Abstract: Recent empirical work suggests that old er and less efficient industries are typically more successful at securing trade protection and income support. Similarly, environmentally damaging industries often lobby effectively for less stringent environmental regulations. This paper explains the lobbying success of these industries in terms of strategic role of investment as a credible commitment device.

Keywords: trade policy; interst groups; investments; industry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F10 F14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 1998
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Published in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, July 2001, Volume 42, Issue 1, pp. 1-22 as "When the Weak Win: The Role of Investment in Environmental Lobbying"

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adl:wpaper:1998-09

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