Unions and Managerial Pay

John DiNardo, Kevin Hallock and Jorn-Steffen Pischke

No 6318, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Unions compress the wage distribution among workers covered by union contracts. We" ask whether unions also have an effect on the managers of unionized firms. To this end we" collected and assembled data on unionization and managerial pay within firms and industries in" the U.S. and across countries. Generally, we find a negative correlation between executive" compensation and unionization in our cross-section data, but no relationship of changes in" unionization on the growth of compensation of executives over time. Using NLRB elections" data, we find that a loss of union members due to decertification elections is associated with" higher CEO pay, although our estimates are imprecise. With CPS data we consistently find that" where unions are stronger, fewer managers are employed.

JEL-codes: J31 J44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997-12
Note: LS
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Working Paper: Unions and Managerial Pay (1998)
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