Tax Design, Information, and Elasticities: Evidence From the French Wealth Tax
Bertrand Garbinti,
Jonathan Goupille-Lebret,
Mathilde Muñoz,
Stefanie Stantcheva and
Gabriel Zucman
No 31333, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
Abstract:
We study a French wealth tax reform that starkly reduced the information some taxpayers must report to the tax authority. Using a new dynamic bunching approach we estimate the average response to the reform, the share of compliers, and the local average treatment effect. The annual wealth growth rate of treated taxpayers falls by 0.5 percentage points after the reform. This decline is likely due to increased evasion, as suggested by the sharp responses in self-reported wealth but not in third-party-reported incomes. The wealth tax base becomes more elastic post reform, illustrating the key role of information policy choices for tax base elasticities.
JEL-codes: H26 H31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eec, nep-iue, nep-pbe and nep-pub
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Working Paper: Tax Design, Information, and Elasticities: Evidence From the French Wealth Tax (2024) 
Working Paper: Tax Design, Information, and Elasticities: Evidence From the French Wealth Tax (2024) 
Working Paper: Tax Design, Information, and Elasticities: Evidence From the French Wealth Tax (2023) 
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