The Design of Trade Agreements

No 22087, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: What does economics have to say about the design of international trade agreements? We review a literature on this question, providing detailed coverage on three key design features of the GATT/WTO: reciprocity, nondiscrimination as embodied in the MFN principle, and tariff bindings and binding "overhang." Each of these features is central to the design of the GATT/WTO, and we argue that an economic perspective can go a long way toward revealing a consistent logic to the inclusion of these design features in trade agreements.

JEL-codes: F02 F13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int
Note: ITI
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (27)

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