Efficiency-Morality Trade-Offs in Repugnant Transactions: A Choice Experiment

Julio Elias, Nicola Lacetera and Mario Macis

No 22632, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Societies prohibit many transactions considered morally repugnant, although potentially efficiency-enhancing. We conducted an online choice experiment to characterize preferences for the morality and efficiency of payments to kidney donors. Preferences were heterogeneous, ranging from deontological to strongly consequentialist; the median respondent would support payments by a public agency if they increased the annual kidney supply by six percentage points, and private transactions for a thirty percentage-point increase. Fairness concerns drive this difference. Our findings suggest that cost-benefit considerations affect the acceptance of morally controversial transactions, and imply that trial studies of the effects of payments would inform the public debate.

JEL-codes: C91 D01 D47 D63 D64 I11 K32 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm, nep-law and nep-sog
Note: EH LE PE
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Working Paper: Efficiency-Morality Trade-Offs in Repugnant Transactions: A Choice Experiment (2016)
Working Paper: Efficiency-Morality Trade-Offs in Repugnant Transactions: A Choice Experiment (2016)
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