Patent Value and Citations: Creative Destruction or Strategic Disruption?

David Abrams (), Ufuk Akcigit and Jillian Grennan

No 19647, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Prior work suggests that more valuable patents are cited more. Using novel revenue data for tens of thousands of patents held by non-practicing entities (NPEs), we find that the relationship between citations and value forms an inverted-U, with fewer citations at the high end of value than in the middle. We explain the inverted-U with a model of innovation that has productive and strategic patents. Empirically, we observe more strategic patents where the model predicts: among inventors in fields of rapid development and where divisional applications are employed. These findings have important implications for our understanding of growth, innovation, intellectual property policy, and patent valuation.

JEL-codes: K1 L2 O3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ino, nep-ipr, nep-pr~, nep-law, nep-sbm and nep-tid
Note: EFG IO LE PR
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Working Paper: Patent Value and Citations: Creative Destruction or Strategic Disruption? (2013)
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