Preemption contests between groups

Stefano Barbieri (), Kai Konrad and David A. Malueg

Working Papers from Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance

Abstract: We consider a preemption game between groups where the ï¬ rst agent to take a costly action wins the prize on behalf of his group. We describe the equilibrium solution of this problem when players differ in their own costs of action and these costs are private information. The equilibrium is typically characterized by delay. The nature of the equilibrium depends on key parameters such as the number of groups and their size. More competition between groups reduces delay, whereas in larger groups members of a given cost type are more reluctant to act but may yield an earlier resolution of the conflict. We analyze asymmetries across groups, focusing on group size and strength of the externalities within groups.

Keywords: preemption; free riding; dynamic conflict; inter-group conflict; dynamic conflict; incomplete information; waiting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 H41 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38 pages
Date: 2019-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-mic
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.tax.mpg.de/RePEc/mpi/wpaper/TAX-MPG-RPS-2019-09.pdf Full text (original version) (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Preemption contests between groups (2020)
Working Paper: Preemption Contests Between Groups (2019)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mpi:wpaper:tax-mpg-rps-2019-09

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Hans Mueller ().