Strategic Disclosure of Demand Information by Duopolists: Theory and Experiment

Jos Jansen () and Andreas Pollak ()
Additional contact information
Jos Jansen: Aarhus Universtity and Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Andreas Pollak: University of Cologne

No 2015_09, Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods from Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Abstract: We study the strategic disclosure of demand information and product-market strategies of duopolists. In a setting where both firms receive information with some probability, we show that firms selectively disclose information in equilibrium in order to influence their competitor’s product-market strategy. Subsequently, we analyze the firms’ behavior in a laboratory experiment. We find that subjects often use selective disclosure strategies, and this finding appears to be robust to changes in the information structure, the mode of competition, and the degree of product differentiation. Moreover, in our experiment, subjects’ product-market conduct is largely consistent with theoretical predictions.

Keywords: common value; product differentiation; Asymmetry; Duopoly; information disclosure; skewed distribution; Incomplete Information; laboratory experiment; Cournot competition; Bertrand competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D22 D82 D83 L13 M4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com and nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2015_09online.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2015_09

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods from Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Marc Martin ().