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Should Political Scientists Use the Self-Confirming Equilibrium Concept? Explaining the Choices of Cognitively Limited Actors. (2007). Lupia, Arthur ; Levine, Adam Seth ; Zharinova, Natasha.
In: MPRA Paper.
RePEc:pra:mprapa:1618.

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