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Understanding Tax Evasion Dynamics. (1999). Hines, James ; Engel, Eduardo ; Jr., .
In: NBER Working Papers.
RePEc:nbr:nberwo:6903.

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  1. Entrepreneurship and tax evasion. (2023). Fernandez-Bastidas, Rocio.
    In: Economic Modelling.
    RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:128:y:2023:i:c:s0264999323003000.

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  2. The impact of international tax information exchange agreements on the use of tax amnesty: evidence from Norway. (2019). Torsvik, Gaute ; Andersson, Jonas ; Schroyen, Fred.
    In: Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:hhs:nhhfms:2019_012.

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  3. The impact of international tax information exchange agreements on the use of tax amnesty: evidence from Norway. (2019). Torsvik, Gaute ; Schroyen, Fred ; Andersson, Jonas.
    In: Discussion Paper Series in Economics.
    RePEc:hhs:nhheco:2019_016.

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  4. Die relative Steuerbelastung mittelständischer Kapitalgesellschaften: Evidenz von handelsbilanziellen Mikrodaten. (2017). Siemers, Lars-Hinrich ; Gebhardt, Heinz ; Lars, Siemers ; Heinz, Gebhardt.
    In: Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik.
    RePEc:lus:zwipol:v:66:y:2017:i:1:p:1-35:n:3.

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  5. Die relative Steuerbelastung mittelständischer Kapitalgesellschaften: Evidenz von handelsbilanziellen Mikrodaten. (2016). Siemers, Lars ; Gebhardt, Heinz.
    In: Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge.
    RePEc:sie:siegen:180-16.

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  6. Tax burden optimization on economic agents by modeling interaction in the taxation system. (2016). Sokolovskyi, Dmytro ; Sokolovska, Olena.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:71110.

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  7. Dynamic tax evasion with audits based on visible consumption. (2016). Menoncin, Francesco ; LEVAGGI, ROSELLA.
    In: Journal of Economics.
    RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:119:y:2016:i:2:d:10.1007_s00712-016-0493-5.

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  8. Optimal dynamic tax evasion: A portfolio approach. (2016). Menoncin, Francesco ; LEVAGGI, ROSELLA.
    In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
    RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:124:y:2016:i:c:p:115-129.

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  9. The Quest for Robust Counterfeit and Piracy Figures: Custom Agencies as Statistical Decision-makers and Recent Evidence Based on German Imports. (2016). Cuntz, Alexander.
    In: The World Economy.
    RePEc:bla:worlde:v:39:y:2016:i:6:p:873-887.

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  10. Dynamic Tax Evasion with Audits based on Conspicuous Consumption. (2015). Menoncin, Francesco ; LEVAGGI, ROSELLA.
    In: Working papers.
    RePEc:ipu:wpaper:33.

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  11. Factors to Curb Tax Evasion: Evidences from the TAXSIM Agent-Based Simulation Model. (2015). Toth, Istvan ; Gulyas, Laszlo ; Mahr, Tamas .
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  12. The Impact of Trust in Government on Tax Paying Behavior of Nonfarm Sole Proprietors. (2014). Liucija, Birskyte .
    In: Scientific Annals of Economics and Business.
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  13. Misreporting in the Value-Added Tax and the Optimal Enforcement. (2014). Hoseini, M.
    In: Other publications TiSEM.
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  14. Misreporting in the Value-Added Tax and the Optimal Enforcement. (2014). Hoseini, Mohammad.
    In: Discussion Paper.
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  15. Dynamics of tax evasion with back auditing, social norm updating, and public goods provision – An agent-based simulation. (2014). Hokamp, Sascha.
    In: Journal of Economic Psychology.
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  16. Tax audits, fines and optimal tax evasion in a dynamic context. (2012). Menoncin, Francesco ; LEVAGGI, ROSELLA.
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  17. Deterrence Policy and the Size of the Shadow Economy in Germany: An Institutional and Empirical Analysis. (2011). Schmidt, Andreas J. ; Feld, Lars P. ; Schneider, Friedrich.
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  18. Old George Orwell Got It Backward: Some Thoughts on Behavioral Tax Economics. (2010). Slemrod, Joel.
    In: FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis.
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  19. WHY DO UNDERGROUND REDUCING POLICIES OFTEN FAIL THEIR SCOPE? SOME ANSWERS FROM THE ITALIAN EXPERIENCE. (2009). Marzano, Elisabetta ; Di Domizio, Marco ; Chiarini, Bruno.
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  20. An overview: A new era of tax enforcement – from “big stick” to responsive regulation. (2008). Leviner, Sagit.
    In: Regulation & Governance.
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  21. The Runaway Taxpayer or: Is Prior Tax Notice Effective against Scofflaws?. (2008). .
    In: Working papers.
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  22. The Runaway Taxpayer or: Is Prior Tax Notice Effective against Scofflaws?. (2008). TURATI, Gilberto ; Piacenza, Massimiliano ; Pellegrino, Simone.
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  23. Why do underground reducing policies often fail their scope? Some answers from the Italian experience. (2008). Marzano, Elisabetta ; Di Domizio, Marco ; Chiarini, Bruno.
    In: Working Papers.
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  24. Social Interaction in Tax Evasion. (2008). Lipatov, Vilen.
    In: MPRA Paper.
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  25. Tax Rate Cuts and Tax Compliance—The Laffer Curve Revisited. (2008). Takats, Elod ; Papp, Tamas K.
    In: IMF Working Papers.
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  26. Tax Evasion in Switzerland: The Roles of Deterrence and Tax Morale. (2006). Frey, Bruno ; Feld, Lars.
    In: IEW - Working Papers.
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  27. Tax Evasion in Switzerland: The Roles of Deterrence and Tax Morale. (2006). Frey, Bruno ; Feld, Lars.
    In: CREMA Working Paper Series.
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  28. Evolution of Tax Evasion. (2005). Lipatov, Vilen.
    In: MPRA Paper.
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  29. A la recherche de ladministration fiscale optimale : lapproche par les coûts defficience.. (2005). Koleva, Kalina .
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  30. Tax Compliance and Rank Dependent Expected Utility. (2005). ROTA GRAZIOSI, Grégoire ; Arcand, Jean-Louis.
    In: The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory.
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  31. The Russian Flat Tax Reform. (2005). Klemm, Alexander ; Keen, Michael ; Ivanova, Anna.
    In: IMF Working Papers.
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  32. A la recherche de ladministration fiscale optimale : lapproche par les coûts defficience. (2005). Koleva, Kalina .
    In: Post-Print.
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  33. Timing tax evasion. (2005). Niepelt, Dirk.
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  34. Tax Evasion in Interrelated Taxes. (2004). Esteller-Moré, Alejandro.
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  35. Timing Tax Evasion. (2004). Niepelt, Dirk.
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  36. Illegal, Immoral, Fattening or What?: How Deterrence and Responsive Regulation Shape Tax Morale. (2004). Frey, Bruno ; Feld, Lars.
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  37. Reglas de selección para la fiscalización de Impuestos a las Ventas. (2004). Arias, Roberto Jose .
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  38. Tax Evasion in Interrelated Taxes. (2004). Esteller, Alejandro .
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  39. Sticks and carrots. (2003). Cowell, Frank.
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  40. To evade taxes or not to evade: that is the question. (2003). Torgler, Benno.
    In: Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics).
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  41. Sticks and Carrots. (2003). Cowell, Frank.
    In: STICERD - Distributional Analysis Research Programme Papers.
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  42. The Evolution of Tax Evasion in the Czech Republic: A Markov Chain Analysis. (2002). Palda, Filip ; Hanousek, Jan.
    In: Public Economics.
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  43. Deterrence and Morale in Taxation: An Empirical Analysis. (2002). Frey, Bruno ; Feld, Lars.
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  44. Searching for ghosts: who are the nonfilers and how much tax do they owe?. (2001). Erard, Brian ; Ho, Chih-Chin.
    In: Journal of Public Economics.
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  45. Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and Administration. (2000). Yitzhaki, Shlomo ; Slemrod, Joel.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
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  46. Auditing with Signals. (2000). Perez-Castrillo, David ; Macho-Stadler, Ines.
    In: Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers.
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