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The Allocation of a Prize (R). (2012). Dubey, Pradeep ; Sahi, Siddhartha.
In: Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1858.

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Cited: 3

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Cites: 29

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Cocites: 50

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Coauthors: 0

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Citations

Citations received by this document

  1. Information Advantage in Common-Value Classic Tullock Contests. (2016). Haimanko, Ori ; Shitovitz, Benyamin ; Aiche, Avishay ; Moreno, Diego ; Einy, Ezra ; Sela, Aner.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:bgu:wpaper:1614.

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  2. On the Role of Information in Contests. (2012). Dubey, Pradeep.
    In: Department of Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:nys:sunysb:12-11.

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  3. The Allocation of a Prize. (2012). Dubey, Pradeep ; Sahi, Siddhartha.
    In: Levine's Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000402.

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References

References cited by this document

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  7. Che, Y.K. and Gale, I. (1997). Rent dissipation when rent seekers are budget constrained. Public Choice 92:109-126.

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  13. Dubey, P., and Sahi, S. (2012). The Allocation of a Prize (Expanded), Working Paper, Department of Economics, Stony Brook University

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    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
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  25. Nti, K.O. (1999) Rent-seeking with asymmetric valuations, Public Choice, 98 (3-4), 415-430.

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  29. Tullock, G. (1975) On the e cient organization of trails. Kyklos 28:745-762.
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Cocites

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  2. Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective. (2016). Lorentziadis, Panos L.
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  3. Bundled procurement. (2015). Chen, Yongmin ; Li, Jianpei.
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  4. Competition for procurement shares. (2013). Dahm, Matthias ; Alcalde, Jose.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:80:y:2013:i:c:p:193-208.

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  6. The Allocation of a Prize (Expanded). (2012). Dubey, Pradeep ; Sah, Siddhartha .
    In: Department of Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:nys:sunysb:12-02.

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  7. Split-award contracts with investment. (2012). McAfee, Randolph ; Li, Jianpei ; Gong, Jiong.
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  8. The Allocation of a Prize (R). (2012). Dubey, Pradeep ; Sahi, Siddhartha.
    In: Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1858.

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  9. Dynamic Price Competition with Capacity Constraints and a Strategic Buyer. (2012). Vettas, Nikolaos.
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  10. The Allocation of a Prize. (2012). Dubey, Pradeep ; Sahi, Siddhartha.
    In: Levine's Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000402.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  11. Competition for Procurement Shares. (2011). Dahm, Matthias ; Alcalde, Jose ; MATTHIAS, DAHM .
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  12. Competition for procurement shares. (2011). Dahm, Matthias ; Alcalde, Jose.
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  13. Efficient division of profits from complementary innovations. (2011). Katz, Michael ; Gilbert, Richard.
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  14. Compact bidding languages and supplier selection for markets with economies of scale and scope. (2011). Guler, Kemal ; Schneider, Stefan ; Sayal, Mehmet ; Bichler, Martin.
    In: European Journal of Operational Research.
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  15. Split-award procurement auctions with uncertain scale economies: Theory and data. (2010). Lopomo, Giuseppe (Pino) ; Brusco, Sandro ; Anton, James.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
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  16. The Allocation of a Prize. (2009). Dubey, Pradeep ; Sahi, Siddhartha.
    In: Department of Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:nys:sunysb:09-01.

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  17. Resale and bundling in auctions. (2009). Pagnozzi, Marco.
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  19. Efficient Division of Profits from Complementary Innovations. (2009). Katz, Michael ; Gilbert, Richard.
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  20. Strategic procurement, openness and market structure. (2008). Levine, Paul ; Garcia-Alonso, Maria ; García-Alonso, María D. C., .
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  25. Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation. (2007). Armstrong, Mark ; Sappington, David E. M., ; Sappington, DavidE. M., .
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  49. Multiple-unit English auctions. (1996). Menezes, Flavio.
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