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Resource Agency Relationship with Privately Known Exploration and Extraction Costs. (2016). Castonguay, Franois ; Lasserre, Pierre.
In: CIRANO Working Papers.
RePEc:cir:cirwor:2016s-56.

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Cited: 5

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Cites: 24

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Cocites: 50

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Coauthors: 0

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Citations

Citations received by this document

  1. Contracts for the Management of a Non-Renewable Resource under Asymmetric Information and Structural Price Breaks. (2018). Ricci, Francesco ; Pouyet, Jerome ; Martimort, David.
    In: PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint).
    RePEc:hal:pseptp:hal-02057380.

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  2. Contracts for the Management of a Non-Renewable Resource under Asymmetric Information and Structural Price Breaks. (2018). Ricci, Francesco ; Pouyet, Jerome ; MARTIMORT, David.
    In: Post-Print.
    RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02057380.

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  3. Extracting Information or Resource? The Hotelling Rule Revisited under Asymmetric Information. (2017). Ricci, Francesco ; Pouyet, Jerome ; Martimort, David.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01431170.

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  4. Extracting Information or Resource? The Hotelling Rule Revisited under Asymmetric Information. (2017). Ricci, Francesco ; Pouyet, Jerome ; MARTIMORT, David.
    In: PSE Working Papers.
    RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-01431170.

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  5. Extracting Information or Resource? The Hotelling Rule Revisited under Asymmetric Information. (2017). Pouyet, Jerome ; MARTIMORT, David ; Ricci, Francesco.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11769.

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References

References cited by this document

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  14. Laffont, J.-J., Rochet, J.-C., 1998. Regulation of a risk averse firm. Games and Economic Behavior 25 (2), 149–173.

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  20. Salanié, B., 1997. The Economics of Contracts: A Primer. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
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  21. Segerson, K., Wu, J., 2006. Nonpoint pollution control: Inducing first-best outcomes through the use of threats. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 51 (2), 165–184.

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